Aviation News

July 14, 2013

Updated 7/14/13: Asiana 777-200 Crash at San Francisco Airport

Photo of Asian crash via surviving passenger David Eun (@Eunner) via Twitter.
Photo of Asian crash via surviving passenger David Eun (@Eunner) via Twitter.
UPDATE- 7-14-13

The first YouTube video shows an animation of the crash. The purple aircraft is an on-course ghost showing where the aircraft should have been had it been following the normal glidepath, versus the painted crash aircraft.

The second clip shows the same animation from inside the cockpit, comparing the views from perspective of both on-path and off-path aircraft.

UPDATE- 7-12-13

In an interview on Friday, the San Francisco police chief confirmed that one of the victims of Asiana 214 was indeed run over by a fire truck after the crash. Sadly, the girl was covered in the firefighting foam used to put out the fire, and the driver of the truck was unable to see her. However, it is still not known whether or not this was the cause of death, or if she has succumbed to her injuries prior to being run over.

Additionally, KPIX is now reporting than a third passenger has died as a result of Asiana 214, but no further details are available at this time.

UPDATE- 7-11-13

The NTSB gave their final daily briefing Thursday afternoon.

During NTSB interviews, the flying pilot reported seeing a light on approach to the runway. He said that while the aircraft was at 500ft he was observing the 3-red, 1-white PAPI lights, when he saw a light that could have been a reflection of the sun from the front of the plane. He briefly looked away, then down into the cockpit. He did not think the light affected his vision much because he could still see the instruments and speed tape. Neither of the other pilots mentioned this light during their interviews, and there was no discussion made among pilot as per the cockpit voice recorder.

Asiana has three FAA inspectors that are assigned to the airline as a Part 129 carrier (foreign air carrier). These inspectors contacted Asiana Airlines 134 times (ramp checks, interactions, etc.) over the past two years, and they reported that Asiana had been a “quiet operator with no significant issues”. As FAA inspectors, they are limited to local ramp and crew checks only, and are unable to examine flight operations in South Korea or in-flight. There are thirty-nine Part 129 airlines overseen by the FAA’s Los Angeles office.

During the final approach, one of the three flight crew members made statements about being above the glideslope, then about being on and then below the glideslope. Thirty-five seconds prior to impact, there was a 500ft callout, and immediately thereafter it was announced that the landing checklist was completed. At 18 seconds prior, there was a 200ft callout. At 9 seconds prior there was an automated 100ft callout, and immediately after was the first comment about speed status. Five second later, 3 seconds before impact, there was a call for a go-around. There was then a second call for a go-around at 1.5 seconds prior, by a crewmember that was different from the one that made the first go-around callout.

From the FDR (Flight Data Recorder) data, the engines and flight control surfaces appeared to have responded as expected to control inputs. There were no anomalies seen in the auto pilot, auto throttle or flight controls according to that FDR data.

Some part of the NTSB investigative team completed their work, and the runway “released” back to airport. With this debris began to be cleared, including rocks that came up from the seawall that had been sent several hundred feet down the runway. Cranes are being used to remove large pieces of wreckage, while smaller pieces are being removed by hand.

The aircraft fuselage is still in the grass off to the side of the runway, and inspectors are documenting the interior of the aircraft, but should done by the end of Thursday. The structure will be cut up and removed piece by piece, cutting both the fuselage and the wings. Part will be taken to a secure, local location.

There was confirmation that three flight attendants were ejected from the aircraft, still in their seats, and that two evacuation slides had deployed inside the cabin. One of the 6 hospitalized flight attendants were released.

The NTSB has only interviewed a portion of the rescue personnel interviews. From the cockpit, to back the wing, the floor was structurally sound. A firefighter reported that when he entered door 2L, the seats just aft of the door were in pristine condition (this was before the fire began and spread). As he walked further aft, he says, more and more damage became prevalent.

Cabin crew reported the exit lighting was on and that the PA system was functional for evacuation.

As for aircraft parts, the number 2 engine had spun 90 degrees counterclockwise, resting against the fuselage. The aircraft fire had begun here and spread due to the presence of this engine up against the aircraft body. The landing gear had separated cleanly from the aircraft, as designed, so as to not create a further safety hazard. Similarly, the fuel tanks were not ruptured, and there was no fuel-fed fire.

NTSB Chairman Debbie Hersman gave kudos and offered gratitude to all of the different organizations, locally and federally, that had contributed to the investigation and recovery, as well as gave other assistance, including The Red Cross, The Salvation Army and United Airlines.

A sink rate mentioned at some point on the approach as well by a member of the flight crew, time and source not provided. Korean media reported that the Relief First Officer stated this 54 seconds prior, but the NTSB has no confirmation about that specific time.

Korean media also reported that the control tower had undergone a crew change 30 seconds prior to impact. The NTSB says that final landing clearance was given at 90 second prior to landing anyway, and emergency vehicles were contacted by air traffic controllers immediately upon impact.

Emergency vehicle response, which had become a topic of discussion over the past day, is something that the NTSB is investigating. They have no conclusions or information to share at this time. They are looking at video camera footage and listening to 911 calls, as well as examining other resources pertaining to this matter.

It is also reported that, at this time, there is no evidence to reflect that an personal electronic devices had affected the performance of the aircraft.

NTSB photo of charred aircraft interior.

UPDATE- 7-10-13

EXIT DOOR

On Wednesday afternoon, the NTSB once again provided an update on the investigation into the crash of Asiana 214. NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman first detailed the flight crew history leading up to the flight. On July 5th, the flying pilot was off duty at home, and had 8 hours of sleep the night before the flight. He went to the airport early to prepare for the flight, and briefed with the instructor pilot at 14:40 in Seoul, and was in the cockpit half an hour before he took command. The instructor pilot had 8 hours sleep, and reported for duty at 14:20. The pilot worked just over 4 hours together after takeoff, and were then relieved. The pair returned to the cockpit for the last 1.5 hours of the flight.

After impact, three of the four flight attendants in the rear of the aircraft were ejected. One of the flight attendants in the rear was found still inside. None of the passenger seats, however, were ejected from the aircraft. Towards the front of the aircraft at doors 1R and 2R, slides deployed inside the aircraft for unknown reasons.

At this point, a flight attendant at the front of the passenger cabin asked the flight deck crew whether or not they should evacuate, to which the crew declined. The cabin manager then made an announcement for passengers to stay in their seats. At around the same time, the flight attendant seated at door 2L could see fire outside the door and evacuation began shortly thereafter.

According to the NTSB, it was not until one and half minutes after the aircraft came to a stop, based on video evidence, that the evacuation began. An aircraft is required to be evacuated 90 seconds after the order is given, and it took that amount of time just to give the order. As to why the pilots delayed ordering an evacuation, Hersman said “we don’t know what the pilots were thinking.”

Hersman went into great detail about aircraft automation system, putting the details of extremely complex systems into simple terms. “In an airplane like the 777, we have very sohpisticed automation, but the pilots can hand fly, or fly manually, the airplane from takeoff,through cruise flight for 10 hours, to landing. They can do that without uisng any automatic if they would like. They can also use an extensive amount of automation.”

Hersman added “There are 2 pilots in the cockpit for a reason. they are there to fly, communicate, navigate, and if using automation, to monitor.”

Hersman then detailed the autothrottle system, saying “it is about power.” “Autothrottle can provide pilots speed, can help them with descending and climbing. It can do different things. It has 5 discrete modes,” Hersman added. She then gave an example, comparing it to the cruise control system in a car. “If you use cruise control in a car, you can set to to 50mph. But if the cruise control allows the cars speed to increase to 55-60-70-75, the driver needs to intervene by using brake or disconnecting cruise control. “Autothrottle is like an iphone with GPS. Its much more sophisticated [than cruise control].” “We see multiple autopilot and autothrottle modes. We need to understand what those modes were, if they were commanded by the pilots, if they were activated inadvertently, if pilots understood what the mode was doing.”

It is expected that runway 28L at SFO will be returned to the airport by the NTSB either tonight or tomorrow. At that point, the airport will be able to clean up and repair the runway for use once again.

Update- 7-9-13

Nose section of Asiana Airline Flight 214 cockpit. Via NTSB

Nose section of Asiana Airline Flight 214 cockpit. Via NTSB

The NTSB held their daily briefing Tuesday evening, shedding even more details into the crash, including technical details and a summary of accounts from the crew. The NTSB has determined that the post-crash fire on the inboard section of the right (no 2) engine was caused by a ruptured oil tank that leaked onto the engine, and that the thrust reverses were not activated. The NTSB has requested radar data from all Boeing 777 approaches to SFO’s runway 28L, as well as for all go-arounds that occurred on that go around since June to give baseline info trends. The flight director was switched on in right seat, but off on left seat. Auto throttle armed, and all 3 fire handles were extended after impact. Flaps were set to 30, and the speed brake lever was down and inactive. The NTSB has removed all of the slides from the aircraft, 8 doors, and 8 slides. One of the doors, door 4L, was outside of the aircraft on the ground, the other 7 are attached to the airframe.

The NTSB is interviewing the cabin crew, as well as airport operations and rescue personnel. They are looking closely at the evacuation, videos, talking to cabin crew, as well as the surviving passengers. As for the crew, 2 of the flight crew, 3 of the 4 interviews have been completed, with the 4th ongoing now. All of the crew members have been cooperative and forthright, but the information the crew provided has not yet been validated by investigators.

There were three pilots in the cockpit at the time of the crash. One pilot was in the back seated in the cabin during the approach and landing. The pilot flying, in left seat, reported that he has 9700 hours of total flight time, about 5000 hours as pilot in command. To complete his initial operating experience, he is required to have 20 flights and 60 flight hours completed. He completed 10 legs, and about 35 hours flying the 777, and was about 1/2 way through initial operating experience on the Boeing 777. He was hired in 1994, did his initial training in Florida, and is rated to fly the 737, 747, A320, and the 777. He was a ground school and simulator instructor for the Airbus A320/A321, as well as a Captain on the A320 from 2005-2013, immediately prior to the 777.

The instructor pilot, in the right seat, is also a Captain. He reported that his total flight time is 13,000 hours, about 3,000 in the 777, total pilot in command time was 10,000 hours. He reported to the NTSB that this was his first trip as an instructor pilot. This was the first time that he and the flying pilot he was instructing flew together.

The Relief 1st Officer, in the jumpseat, reported that he had 4,600 flight hours, 900-1000 hours flying the 777. He flew F-5s and F-16s in the Korean Air Force. He had previously flown to SFO several times as the pilot monitoring.

The instructor pilot stated to the NTSB that they were slightly high when they passed 1,400 feet, and set vertical speed to 1500 feet per minute. At this point, the PAPI indicators displayed 3 red 1 white light, meaning they were too low. The instructor pilot told the flying pilot to pull back, and to set speed at 137 knots. He had assumed that the auto throttles were maintaining speed. Between 500 and 200 feet, they had a lateral deviation, and were low, and were trying to correct at that point. At 200 feet, the instructor pilot noticed the 4 PAPI lights were red, airspeed was in the hatched area on the speed tape, and that auto throttles were not working as anticipated. He went to push throttles forward, but found it was already done.

Post crash, the First Officer in jumpseat described that a slide deployed inside and trapped a FA. PAX also said slides deployed inside as well.

The First Officer received medical treatment for a cracked rib. Neither of the other two pilots were admitted to hospital. Drug and alcohol testing required for part 121 carriers based in the US does not apply to foreigh crews, according to the NTSB. Part 129 refers to operators from foreign countries. Under 121, crews must be tested after an incident. None of the crew were tested in this incident.

Two of the flight attendants in the rear of the aircraft were ejected during the impact sequence. They were found down the runway and off the side, but both survived. We now also know that the main landing gear impacted seawall first, and then the tail. Pieces of the cabin are found very early on in the debris field.

“The crew is required to maintain a safe aircraft,” NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman stated at the end of the press conference, adding “We are the advocate for the traveling public.”

Update- 7-8-13

The NTSB has taken to Twitter during the Asiana 214 investigation to keep the public informed on their progress

The NTSB has taken to Twitter during the Asiana 214 investigation to keep the public informed on their progress

The NTSB held another briefing Monday afternoon, giving some further insight into what happened to Asiana flight 214. The flight was cleared by NORCAL TRACON for a 17 mile straight in final approach to SFO’s runway 28L. On short final, the sequence of events occurred as following:

At 1600 feet, the autopilot was switched off. At 1400 feet, air speed was 170 knots. At 1000ft, airspeed was 149 knots, and at 500ft airspeed was 134k. At 200 feet, airspeed was 118 knots, about 16 seconds prior to impact. At 125ft, the throttles were being moved forward & airspeed was 112kts. The target airspeed for touchdown was 137 knots. At about 3 seconds before impact, the FDR recorded its lowest speed of 103 knotts. At this time, engines were at 50% power and increasing. At impact, air speed was 106 knots, a full 31 knots slower than the target speed.

A survival factors team will document over 300 seats on the aircraft to identify their condition and performance, and how they were damaged. After walking the crash scene, the NTSB has determined that the lower portion of the tail cone is in the rocks at the sea wall, and that there was a significant piece of the tail in the water. Additional aircraft parts in the water are visible in the water at low tide. The right engine is tucked in adjacent to the wing root of the aircraft, and the left engine was “liberated” from the aircraft.

Deborah Hersman, Chair of the NTSB, also put to rest rumors that the aircraft entered a steep descent of 4,000 feet per minute, as reviewed radar data does not confirm this. As for the possibility of a passenger being struck by fire rescue equipment, that investigation is ongoing and they can not confirm anything at this point.

There are currently 20 NTSB investigators on the ground, led by Bill English. The NTSB will provide another update on Tuesday.

Update- 7-7-13 6:30pm

The NTSB has just released several detailed photos of the crash scene, including shots of the interior showing extreme damage. The tweets were sent without any commentary.

 

 

 

 

 

 

UPDATE- 7-7-13 5pm

CNN Asiana Video

CNN Asiana Video

The NTSB on Sunday evening held a press conference, detailing some preliminary details obtained by the fight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder.

CVR and FDR contain good data. Prelim data shows CVR recorded 2 hours of data. During approach, the throttle were at idle and airspeed was “significantly” slowed below target airspeed of 137 kts, “and we’re not talking about a few knots,” said Deborah Hersman, chair of the NTSB. 7 seconds prior to impact, a call to increase speed. At 4 seconds before impact, the stick shaker, which notified pilots that a stall is imminent by literally shaking the control stick, activated. The throttles were advanced a few seconds before impact, and engines responded properly. At about 1.5 seconds before impact, the crew called for a go-around, but it was too late. The flight data recorder shows that the flaps were properly set to 30 degrees, and the landing gear was down.

The crew will be interviewed over the next several days, and more details will emerge. At the time of the incident, the ILS system at SFO was out of service, as was the glide slope. However, that information was contained in NOTAMs, so this would have been known by the crew. Precision approach path indicators lights on runway 28L were damaged in the crash sequence, but were in service before the crash.

Just before the press conference, video surfaced on CNN that shows the approach and impact, and it tells quite a story. Check out the video here. There were no reports of wind shear, or any adverse weather conditions at the time of the crash.

When asked about possible pilot error as the cause of the crash, Deborah Hersman responded “I will tell you everything is on the table right now. It is too early to rule anything out. I ask you to report the facts, and make sure the public is well informed. We will not speculate, and we will not draw conclusions.”

ORIGINAL UPDATE

Asiana Flight 214 from Incheon, South Korea, a 777-200ER (registered HL7742) has crash-landed at San Francisco International Airport just before noon on Saturday.

Witnesses are reporting that the aircraft made a hard landing on runway 28L, possibly falling short of the runway. for unknown reasons, leading to the crash and a major fire. The aircraft experienced destruction of the landing gear, along with separation of both engines and both the tail and tail cone. The tail section seems to have made contact and separated from the aircraft at rocky shoreline prior to or at the beginning of the runway, far short of the intended touchdown area.

After earlier reported that all 307 on board survived, it is now coming in that 2 people have died in the crash, and there are multiple injuries, including burns. Photos from the scene indicate that evacuation via emergency slides did take place.

San Francisco Airport is closed until further notice.

Asiana 777-200LR (reg. HL7742), seen here in better days. (Photo by Mark Szemberski)

The flight path of Asian Flight 214 from Incheon to San Francisco.

We will be updating as more details develop…


  • WANg

    HL7742 is a 200ER, not LR. The engines look like PW4090s instead of GE90s.

  • Bovine500

    A very short time ago, KCBS radio in San Francisco reported that three people from that flight — none of whom appeared burned, or otherwise critically injured — were transported in one ambulance to the emergency department at Saint Francis Hospital. They added that the hospital was not expecting any other admissions of flight passengers or crew.

    Saint Francis provides general care and operates the regional burn center for the S.F. Bay area.

    I’m hoping the report aired on KCBS was accurate. It’s likely that any and all burn victims from an accident at SFO would be taken to Saint Francis, so if the hospital has been told not to expect more admissions from SFO maybe that means there are no patients in need of burn care. It’s possible that the triage plan is to take three patients each to different area hospitals.

    My thoughts and prayers are with the two people who didn’t survive this tragedy, as well as with the injured people and their loved ones.

  • Ricky

    Would not be surprised if we find out the pilots had the wrong altimeter setting.

  • Nalliah Thayabharan

    The Asiana Flight 214 – a Boeing 777-200 – crashed in favorable weather —
    partly cloudy skies and light wind.The twin-engine Boeing 777-200 is
    one of the most popular and safest long-range planes, often used for
    flights of 12 hours or more, from one continent to another.

    The Asiana Flight 214 originated from Shanghai, China, left Seoul’s
    Incheon International Airport 10 hours and 23 minutes before its crash
    landing on Runway 28 at SFO. The 7 yrs old old Pratt & Whitney
    PW4090 powered Boeing 777-200 entered final approach at an abnormally
    low speed of 98 knots per hour (181 km/h) – well below the target
    landing speed of 137 knots per hour (253 km/h).

    The two pilots on Flight 214 were Lee Jung Min, 49, a graduate of the
    Korea Aerospace University who joined Asiana in 1996, and Lee Kang Kuk,
    46, who started his career at the airline in 1994 and got his pilot’s
    license in 2001. Lee Jung Min has flown a total of 12,387 hours with
    3,220 hours on a Boeing 777, while Lee Kang Kuk has flown a total of
    9,793 hours, with only 43 hours of which were on a Boeing 777. The pilot
    – Lee Kang Kuk – did not make a distress call before landing. He came
    in short of the runway, tried to correct buy pulling up, got the nose
    too high and hit tail first. Pilot Lee Kang Kuk was attempting his first
    Boeing 777 landing at SFO, but his ninth overall with the Boeing 777.
    The aircraft crashed hard to the ground, smashed the landing gear and
    spun around. The fuel tanks ruptured, but being at the end of the flight
    did not contain a lot of fuel and the resulting fire was “relatively”
    small and most of the passengers were able to get out in good shape.

    The SFO Airport had intentionally disabled ground-based landing guidance
    system at the time of the crash. The Boeing 777-200, registered as
    HL7742, was delivered on March 07, 2006, and had accumulated 35,700 hrs
    on 5,185 cycles as of March 31, 2013.

    Passengers Ye Mengyuan and Wang Linjia, both 16 years old from Jiangshan
    in eastern China may have been run over and killed by a rescue vehicle.
    One child and five adults remained in critical condition. A total of
    307 people were on board, 291 passengers and 16 crew members. The
    passengers included 77 Koreans, 141 Chinese, 64 Americans, 3 Indians, 3
    Canadians, 1 French, 1 Japanese and 1 Vietnamese.

    On January 23, 2013, the Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Centre (JACDEC) announced that Korean Airlines had the fifth worst safety record among 60 international airlines that were reviewed.

    On January 06, 2007 – Korean Air Lines Flight 769 from Seoul to Akita, Japan, landed on an unoccupied taxiway instead of the intended runway 10, which was the airport’s only runway. The Boeing 737-900 aircraft with 124 passengers and 9 crew landed without any injury or damage.

    On April 15, 1999 Korean Air Cargo Flight 6316 (McDonnell Douglas MD-11) from Shanghai to Seoul took off despite the Korean co-pilot’s repeated misunderstanding and miscommunication with the tower and the pilot. The aircraft climbed to 1,500 meters and the captain, after receiving two wrong affirmative answers from the first officer that the required altitude should be 500 meters, thought that the aircraft was 1,000 meters too high. The captain then pushed the control column abruptly forward causing the aircraft to start a rapid descent. Neither was able to recover from the dive. The airplane plummeted into an industrial development zone 10 kilometers southwest of Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport. The plane plunged to the ground, hitting housing for migrant workers, and exploded.

    On March 15, 1999 – Korean Air Flight 1533 (McDonnell Douglas MD-83) from Seoul to Pohang departed for Pohang. Weather at Pohang was poor with degraded visibility and gusty 25 knot winds. The pilot failed at the first attempt to land. After the second approach the plane touched down, but overran the runway. The aircraft skidded through 10 antennas, a reinforced barbed wire fence and came to rest against an embankment. The landing snapped the fuselage in half.

    On August 05, 1998 – Korean Air Flight 8702 (Boeing 747-400) from Tokyo to Seoul. The flight departed Tokyo at 16:50 for a flight to Seoul, scheduled to arrive there at 19:20. Inclement weather at Seoul forced the flight crew to divert to Jeju. The aircraft took off from Cheju at 21:07 bound for Seoul. On landing in Seoul, the 747 bounced multiple times and slid 100 meters off the runway before coming to a stop in a grassy area.

    On August 06 1997 – Korean Air Flight 801 (Boeing 747-3B5) from Seoul to Agana, Guam, The crew attempted a night-time approach to Guam runway 06L. Flight 801 had descended 250 meters below the prescribed altitude, struck the 225 meters Nimitz Hill at a height of 200 meters and crashed in a jungle valley, breaking up and bursting into flames. Subsequent investigation found that the captain’s failure to adequately brief and execute the non-precision approach and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain’s execution of the approach were directly responsible for the crash. It was the first fatal crash of the Boeing 747-300. Contributing factors were the captain’s fatigue and Korean Air’s inadequate flight crew training.

    On September 22 1994 – Korean Air Flight 916F (Boeing 747) from Zurich to Busan. Eight days prior, the aircraft had encountered a severe hailstorm over Elba, Italy which led to a near miss incident. The aircraft sustained severe damage to the radome, cockpit windows and engines but managed to reach Zurich safely. Some repair work was done, but the aircraft needed to be ferried to Busan for final repairs. Boeing released the aircraft with some take-off performance changes, which included a limited gross weight by 70,000 pounds and increased takeoff speeds for V1, V2 and VR by 15, 17 and 14 knots respectively. The aircraft was cleared for a Runway 14 takeoff and ZUE 5P departure. After a long take-off run, the aircraft lifted off the runway at the very end and climbed slowly. At 900 meters beyond the runway end the aircraft cleared some adjacent buildings at fewer than 50 meters. Subsequent investigation found that despite clear instructions to reduce weight, the crew had overloaded the aircraft by 86,700 pounds

    On August 10 1994 – Korean Air Flight 2033 (Airbus A300) from Seoul to Jeju, the flight approached faster than usual to avoid potential wind-shear. 15 meters above the runway the co-pilot, who was not flying the aircraft, decided that there was insufficient runway left to land and tried to perform a go-around against the captain’s wishes. The aircraft touched down 1,773 meters beyond the runway threshold. The aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining 1,227 meters of runway and overran at a speed of 104 knots. After striking the airport wall and a guard post at 30 knots, the aircraft burst into flames and was incinerated. The cabin crew was credited with safely evacuating all passengers although only half of the aircraft’s emergency exits were usable

    On June 13 1991 – Korean Air (Boeing 727) from Jeju to Daegu, the aircraft performed an unexpected gear-up landing at Daegu. The crew failed to read out the landing procedure checklist and therefore didn’t select the gear down option. Subsequent investigation revealed that the pilot instructed the co-pilot to pull the fuse from the warning system because the repeated warnings that the landing gear was not deployed were, “irritating and distracting,” him as he attempted to land. With the warning horn disabled, the Korean pilot brought the plane in and slid down the length of the runway on the central structural rib in the belly of the aircraft
    On July 27 1989 – Korean Air Flight 803 (McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30) from Jeddah to Tripoli. The aircraft initially departed Seoul on a flight to Tripoli with intermediate stops at Bangkok and Jeddah. Visibility was varying between 100–800 feet and the runway 27 ILS had been reported unserviceable. On final approach to runway 27 the aircraft crashed short of the runway, striking 4 houses and a number of cars.
    December 23, 1983 – Korean Air Cargo Flight 084 (McDonnell Douglas DC-10) from Anchorage to Los Angeles, while taxiing out in fog, the Korean crew became disoriented and ended up on the wrong runway. During the takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with Southcentral Air Flight 59, a Piper Pa-31 which was taking off from runway 6L-24R for a flight to Kenai. The nine occupants of the South Central Air flight were injured. The DC-10 overran the runway by 1,434 feet and came to rest 40 feet right of the extended centerline. Federal Investigators determined that the Korean pilot had failed to follow accepted procedures during taxi – causing disorientation while selecting the runway. The pilot also failed to use the compass to confirm his position. Ultimately the pilot’s decision to proceed with takeoff without ever knowing if he was on the correct runway caused the impact.
    September 01, 1983 – Korean Air Flight 007 (Boeing 747-230B) departed from New York City for Seoul via Anchorage. At 5:00 AM the flight was cleared directly to the Bethel VOR beacon and then on to the Romeo 20 route. The pilot mistakenly diverted from its intended course and passed 12 miles north of the Bethel beacon. While approaching the Kamchatka peninsula, six Soviet MiG-23 fighters were scrambled. Because a U.S. Air Force Boeing RC-135 intelligence plane was flying in the area east off Kamchatka, the Soviets may have assumed the 747 radar echo to be the RC-135. The flight left Soviet airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk and the fighters returned to their base. Passing abeam the Nippi beacon (four hours after take-off), the aircraft was 185 miles off course and headed for Sakhalin. Two Soviet Su-15 ‘Flagon’ fighters were scrambled from the Dolinsk-Sokol airbase. At 18:16 UTC, flight 007 re-entered Soviet airspace. At 18:22, for the second time, Soviet command ordered destruction of the target. Two air-to-air missiles were launched by one of the fighters and one struck the Boeing at 18:26. Cabin pressure was lost and the aircraft suffered control problems, causing the plane, after a 12 minute flight, to spiral into the sea near Moneron Island. The event was denounced by the US Reagan Administration as a deliberate and wanton act of murder by an “evil empire.

    On April 20, 1978 – Korean Air Flight 902 (Boeing 707) departed from Paris for Anchorage and flew to within 780 km of the North Pole when Canadian officials alerted the crew they were off course. They changed course, but worsened the situation by setting a course directly across the Barents Sea and Soviet airspace. The plane was initially recognized by Soviet anti-aircraft defense radars as a Boeing 747. Sukhoi Su-15TM jets were sent to intercept. When both jets were flying next to the Korean airliner, the Korean captain claimed he slowed the plane and initiated landing lights. Nevertheless the Su-15 crews were ordered to shoot down the plane. According to US intelligence sources the Soviet pilot tried for several minutes to convince his superiors to cancel the attack on the civilian airliner. After an additional order two P-60 rockets were launched. The first missed but the second severely damaged the left wing and shrapnel punctured the fuselage, causing rapid decompression that killed two passengers. The Korean pilot initiated an emergency descent to 5,000 feet and entered clouds. Both Soviet jets lost the Korean plane in the clouds. The aircraft continued at low altitude, crossing the Kola Peninsula while searching for a landing opportunity. With night quickly coming on, several unsuccessful attempts were made before the plane landed on the ice of Lake Korpijärvi, near Kem, USSR. All occupants were rescued by Soviet helicopters. Damage– severe, Injuries– multiple, Deaths- 2 (two of 197 passengers)
    On August 02 1976 – Korean Air (Boeing 707) cargo flight departed from Tehran for Seoul when, on takeoff from runway 29, the aircraft inexplicably deviated from the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) procedure and drifted to the right instead of performing a left turnout. It continued and struck mountains at an altitude of 2,020 meters