Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
Is the implication here that the crew was supposed to disengage the autothrottle during the landing checklist (despite calling checklist complete), and therefore the 'retard' of the throttle had no affect? Or that they didn't retard the throttle on landing? I've watched some Airbus landing videos on YouTube and sometimes it seems like the crew doesn't actually touch the throttle levers when the 'retard' command is issued, but perhaps this is related to what mode the system is in.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
In the Airbus' , the act of disconnecting the autothrust (Airbus' verbage) is accomplished simply by moving the throttles to the idle detent, remember the thrust lever does not move in response to engine power changes - ala Boeing.
The circumstances are similar to what happened to an HP A320 a few years back where one throttle was moved back into the TOGA position after touchdown while the other remained in reverse. Ironically it too had 1 inoperative T/R
http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec ... 20020828-1
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
maybe they shouldn't fly the airplanes with a deferred reverser bucket. sounds like it could be a glitch in the FADEC software.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
So let me get this straight...the plane in fully configured for landing but because a switch isn't thrown it remains at speed? What's the reason for this? Its sounds to me like a simple automatic safety feature that should disengage or warn the pilots of the error.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
What's being reported is the Right hand thrust lever was not retarded to idle, therefore the RH engine was still producing thrust for the approach. This also meant the autospoilers did not deploy and autobrakes were similarly disabled.
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TAM A320 crew did not retard right-hand thrust lever
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Information on the TAM Airbus A320 accident shortly to be made available to operators will show that the crew retarded only the thrust lever for the left-hand engine during touchdown, leaving the other in its forward position.
Industry sources say the information, to be set out in a communique, shows that the crew made a normal approach to Sao Paulo Congonhas Airport on 17 July with auto-thrust selected – the aircraft operating under a ‘managed thrust’ regime – and the thrust levers in the ‘climb’ position.
For reasons yet to be explained, the pilot, in the final moments before touchdown, retarded only the thrust lever for the left-hand engine – first into the ‘idle’ position, then into ‘reverse’. This action disconnected the auto-thrust, as per its design. The failure to move the right-hand engine’s thrust lever to the reverse position runs contrary to the standard operating procedure which calls for both levers to be set to ‘idle’ and then 'reverse' – even with a thruster reverser inoperative.
It is unclear why the right-hand engine thrust lever was left in position. Newly-released cockpit-voice transcripts have notably highlighted the crew’s awareness that only the left-hand engine had an operable thrust-reverser; the right-hand reverser had been deactivated. This, however, should not have made a difference to the thrust retardation procedure.
As the aircraft began to slow after touchdown the thrust being produced by the right-hand engine remained at the level it was at when the auto-thrust had disconnected. With the thrust lever forward the spoilers would not have deployed, and the auto-brake would have similarly been inhibited.
In the cockpit transcript the co-pilot appears to state that the A320’s spoilers did not activate on touchdown and, as the situation develops, the pilots are heard to say that they cannot slow the aircraft. Flight-data recorder information indicates that the pilots repeatedly pressed on the brakes in a bid to stop the jet but did not retard the right-hand thrust lever.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
Fascinating and sad. I looked around online for an explanation of how this system works, and found this on retired UA Capt. Meryl Getline's website. Pretty good at describing this in layman's terms...
http://www.fromthecockpit.com/Throttle_Retard.html
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
Though it does sound like pilot error and you'd expect them to know the plane better than that, it sounds as though this Airbus system is more of a hassle and hazard than a help.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
Definitely , it seems panic and fear took hold pretty quick , I can only imagine how that must've felt
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
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So let me get this straight...the plane in fully configured for landing but because a switch isn't thrown it remains at speed? What's the reason for this? Its sounds to me like a simple automatic safety feature that should disengage or warn the pilots of the error.
Well you're right thats not how it should be...and it isn't. In the airbus the moment you bring back the throttles from the position that the A\T system is holding the speed, The A\T system will be disengaged. Now as for the number 2 engine still producing power? Unless the PF had lost some fingers, its hard to see how he could have missed pulling both throttles back.
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Though it does sound like pilot error and you'd expect them to know the plane better than that, it sounds as though this Airbus system is more of a hassle and hazard than a help.
Look at this a photographer claiming pilot error. We don't know all the facts as of yetso this shouldn't be possibility yet. But if you want to get into it? Why wasn't the airport closed? The controllers knew weather was bad. Why didn't they divert flights?
Oh I forgot because these are the same Brazilian Air Force controllers that tried to screw over those two American pilots. Remember that?
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spoilers did not activate on touchdown
This might be a maintenance problem, on the aircraft I fly and have flown, spoilers are activated when either
A)The main gears touch down and set off weight sensors in the bogies.
B)The main gears reach a certain speed after touchdown.
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maybe they shouldn't fly the airplanes with a deferred reverser bucket. sounds like it could be a glitch in the FADEC software.
It was probably okay to do in the minimum no go book.
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I've watched some Airbus landing videos on YouTube and sometimes it seems like the crew doesn't actually touch the throttle levers when the 'retard' command is issued, but perhaps this is related to what mode the system is in.
You can just switch from mode to mode. The aircraft does it manually. And as for not seeing the crew move the throttles to idle it may in fact be because they 1) are at idle, or 2) Using the power for a smoother touchdown. That retard 'command' or warning will always go off no matter what and then you will get the instruction on your PFD to 'FLARE'. The aircraft just wants to remind the crew that if they have power they will float and even climb during the flare if there is too much power.
More than crew error, this seems like another issue with the quality airframes that Airbus is making.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
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Originally Posted by Informant
It was probably okay to do in the minimum no go book.
maybe that no go book (MEL) list needs to be shortened. to fly an airplane onto a contaminated runway without reversers isn't my idea of fun. on a short, steep and wet runway i'd want everything that could help me stop working to help me stop.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
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n a short, steep and wet runway i'd want everything that could help me stop working to help me stop.
We better go to the local Airport Authority with that.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
TAM now says it will require both reversers to be operative for operating to CGH and SDU ( Santos-Dumont ) , sounds wise to me..
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TAM reverses thrust reverser policy; aircraft landing at Congonhas must have both activated
Thursday August 16, 2007
TAM told a Brazilian congressional panel holding hearings on last month's A320 crash that it no longer allows aircraft to land at Sao Paulo Congonhas or Rio de Janeiro Santos Dumont without both thrust reversers activated, a change in policy put in place after the accident.
The airline has admitted that the right thrust reverser was deactivated during a maintenance check several days before the July 17 crash at CGH that killed 199 people, including all 187 aboard (ATWOnline, July 30). But it downplayed that as a potential cause and said turning off the reverser was in accordance with regulations "stipulated by. . .Airbus and approved by [Brazil's] National Civil Aviation Agency."
Marco Aurelio Castro, TAM's head of security, testified this week that shortly after the accident the carrier mandated that aircraft landing at CGH and SDU, which have short runways, must have both thrust reversers activated, the Associated Press reported. Castro said that despite the policy change, the airline doubts the inoperative thrust reverser caused the crash. It had not revealed the policy change publicly.
Airbus VP-Flight Safety Yannick Malinge testified before the same committee last week that "there was no mechanical error or malfunction of the computers onboard" leading to the crash and said it was "premature" to cite the deactivated thrust reverser as a cause.
Legislators serving on the panel expressed outrage last week when it was revealed by Brazil's air force that in contrast to government regulations covering commercial aircraft, the A319 that transports President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva must have both thrust reversers activated at all times. The "security rule" was in place long before the accident but covers only the president's aircraft, air force officials testified.
Re: TAM 3045 CVR Transcript
It sounds wise but even so all calculations are to be done without TR. As I said before, all additional stopping ability realized with it is just an added bonus.
