Interesting Aviation Reading/Research Topics?

[PhilDernerJr]

During downtime, I often use Wikipedia or other sites to read-up on some interesting events or people, whether it be a crash, a mystery or whatever. Eastern 401, Amelia Earhart, Flight 19, etc.

I was wondering if anyone here can list a few other aviation-related events that people might enjoy reading up on. Feel free to psot links, too!

Not to add pressure to anyone, but I'll be expecting cool stuff from both Moose and Derf.

[AirtrafficController]

I found this article about Air transports of heads of state and government. It always makes me pumped for UN week.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_transp ... government

[G-BOAD]

Last year I did a paper on Iran Air 655 for history; which I found to be an interesting topic. Happy to post the paper here if anyone wishes?

[PhilDernerJr]

Sure, go for it. :)

[G-BOAD]

Very complicated issue, but very interesting. Hope you enjoy the read.

US History H
May, 2008
Research Paper
The Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the United States Navy
In 1979 Iran embarked on its glorious revolution, throwing out its previous ruler, the Shah, and putting in power Ayatollah Khomeini. Sad'am Hussein, Iraq's leader saw this as a perfect opportunity to invade its rival Iran. While Sad'am was expecting a quick 3 week invasion, he got an eight year war with millions of deaths and cities leveled. Towards the end of the war, the United States started policing the Persian Gulf, with warships, to protect Iraq oil exports, which were targeted by Iran.
One of these ships was the USS Vincennes, commanded by Capitan Rogers. On July 3rd, 1988, the Vincennes was heading back to Bahrain, so sailors onboard could celebrate their July 4th Holiday break. In the morning, the Vincennes received a call from a sister ship the USS Montgomery, in the Straight of Hormuz. The Vincennes received permission to send one of its helicopters to investigate. As it turned out the USS Montgomery was being attacked by boats of the Iranian Guardians of the Revolution, who were known for attacking Iraqi and American ships. Also, the Vincennes helicopter received anti aircraft fire from the gunboats. The Vincennes saw this as an act of war and proceeded to the Straight of Hormuz to help the Montgomery.
This day Iran Air 655 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from
Tehran to Dubai, with a stopover in Bandar Abbas. On July 3rd the flight was delayed 27 minutes due to a passenger with visa problems. Under the command of Capt. Mohsen Rezaian, at 9:47 (Bahrain / Vincennes time, 10:17 local time at Bandar Abbas) the flight took of from Bader Abbas, for a 30 minute flight over the Straight of Hormuz into Dubai.
At 9:47, seconds after takeoff, the Vincennes notices an unknown plane
on its radar. Although the radar is very sophisticated, it cannot determine the size or type of aircraft. The identification supervisor, Anderson, tries tracking the unknown plane. Each flight is given its own unique squawk code. Military aircraft use modes 1, 2 and 4, while civilian aircraft use mode 3. However, squawking mode 3 doesn't identify an aircraft as civilian, as a military aircraft could be hiding its true identity. The plane initially squawks a mode 3:6760. Anderson checks the flight schedule out of Bader Abbas, but does not find anything. Eventually the mode 2:1100 also shows up on the Vincennes radio. Anderson retrieves his code book and looks up mode 2:1100. This is the code of an Iranian F- 14, and so the unidentified aircraft gets labeled as an F-14 on the technical displays. The Vincennes tries numerous times to contact the aircraft, but the aircraft fails to respond. Fearing it as a threat, Lusting, the antiaircraft adviser onboard calls headquarters at 9:51 to
ask for permission to shoot the aircraft down if it gets within 20 miles. Tactical Commander Leach is monitoring the aircraft's altitude. Leach informs that the aircraft is descending, a traditional attack pattern. This becomes the deciding factor in Caption Roger's decision to fire (Mistaken Identity). However, CIC officer Lieutenant Montford expresses his feelings that the plane is a commercial airliner. Captain Rogers describes the series of events in his book: "Montford, standing behind me monitoring the circuits and writing the timeline of events, looked over Scott's shoulder at his council readout and saw a mode III at an altitude of 8,000 or 9,000 feet rising slowly. He stepped forward and said, 'Possible commair [commercial airliner].' I extended an arm over my head and acknowledged him" ( Rogers , 14).With the plane nine miles away, Captain Rogers gives his decision to fire. At 9:54:43 the missiles strike the plane, causing it to crash, and kill two hundred and ninety
civilians onboard.
There were several crucial errors made by the US navy that day. When
Anderson first tried to track the aircraft, he moved his ball tab over to the blimp to receive a squawk from the aircraft. But, he held it in place for 90 seconds, so it also picked up signals from the airport at Bandar Abbas. The initial mode 3 was from the civilian Airbus. However, when Anderson noticed mode 2, it was from an Iranian F-14 which was on the tarmac in the Bandar Abbas Airport. This small human error caused the confusion in the identification of the aircraft (Mistaken Identity). Anderson checked the flight schedule out of Bandar Abbas, nevertheless there was a time difference between the Bahrain time used on the ship, and the local time at Bandar Abbas, which the schedule was listed in. Including the 27 minute delay, Anderson believed there was nothing departing Bandar Abbas within an hour (Mistaken Identity). Furthermore, even with all its state of the art technology, the USS Vincennes did not have a radio tuned to civil air traffic control frequencies. Additionally,
the crew made ten distress calls to contact and warn the aircraft; however seven of them were on a military frequency. There were only three made on a civilian distress frequency, which the flight could hear. When the three civilian distress calls were made, the Iranian flight was unsure if the Vincennes was referring to him. The radio operators cited the aircraft's groundspeed; however, the aircraft displays airspeed, which is different. If the Vincennes called out the aircraft squawk code, 6760, the captain would have known the Vincennes was referring to him.
One of the key moments that convinced Rogers to fire occurred when
Leach called that the aircraft was descending. However, as an investigative panel reviewed the data, the aircraft was not descending, but rather ascending the whole time. A team of doctors believed a case of "scenario fulfillment" played a role in the mistake. Leach was so convinced something was going to happen, even though the data showed him otherwise, he believed the aircraft was descending, and attacking. Rear Admiral Fogarty noted in his report Formal Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 in 3 July 1988 "?it was discovered that there were discrepancies between the C&D [command and decision MK 1] tape data and what various members of the CIC believed they saw, the senior investigation officer requested the professional advice of USN marine corps personnel who have studied combat stress. The following opinions draw heavily on their conclusions. Stress, task fixation, and unconcerned distortion of data may have played a major role in
the incident" (Fogarty, 44, 45)
Clearly, this event provoked major international uproar. A US naval
ship shooting down a civilian airliner on a scheduled flight in an international air corridor was unacceptable. The world saw this as a terrible act of aggression. Additionally, people discovered the Vincennes was 4 miles into Iranian territorial waters at the time of the incident.
In 1983 the Soviets shot down a passenger Korean Airlines 747 that was
over Soviet airspace, believing it was a spy plane. This attack killed 269 civilians. The Soviets received heavy criticism from the world, specifically the United States. Although the instances seemed similar, the United States pointed out "fundamental differences" (AP, US downplays similarities to KAL 007). According the New York Times, "Admiral Crowe said the Iran Air aircraft was flying in a war zone at low altitude during combat. He also said the Iranian plane failed to change course or respond to three warnings on a civilian radio network?Crowe said there were reasons indicating classified 'electronic' indications'?that lead American crew members aboard the cruiser Vincennes to believe that they were confronting an American built F-14 fighter of the Iranian Air Force" (Erlanger, NYT). Admiral Crowe also added "One of the most difficult problems is from a radar blip (sic), especially [a] head on target, [is] to identify the type of target."
The US Navy summoned Real Admiral Fogarty to conduct an investigation
of the incident. After hours of testimony and analysis of data Fogarty published his findings in "Formal Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iran Air flight 655 on 3 July 1988". In his report Fogarty concludes "Based on the information used by the CO [Chief Officer] in making his decision, the short time frame available to him in which to make his decision, aand (sic) his personal belief that his ship and the USS MONTGOMERY were being threatened, he acted in a prudent manner" (Fogarty, 42). Fogerty also adds "Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy by hazarding one of their civilian airliners by allowing it to fly a relaatively (sic) low altitude air route in close proximity to IRGC [Iranian revolutionary guard corps] boats were actively engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. Navel vessels" (Fogarty, 42).
Undoubtedly, Iran was outraged by this event. On July 24, 1990, Iran
submitted a claim to the International Court of Justice. Iran accused the US of willfully and knowingly shooting the plane down, and dismissed the claims of misinformation. Iran states "assumption that the Vincennes ' crew was fatigued and under stress, is equally implausible. The Vincennes crew had only arrived in the Persian Gulf in May 1988 and were thus fresh. Indeed, this was their first taste of action" (Iran , 243). Iran also stated the Vincennes had very advanced radar. Iran also stated the other ships in the area, including the USS Montgomery and USS Sides identified the aircraft as commercial. "The assertion that they crack when confronted with a single, non-threatening aircraft cannot be reconciled with the fact that the crew of the Sides and the Montgomery correctly identified the plane as commercial" (Iran, 243). Additionally, the aircraft was flying over a well know international air corridor. Iran adds "?what is plausible is that the Vincennes 'hankered for an
opportunity to show its stuff'" (Iran 243). In February of 1996 the US government agreed to pay Iran 131.8 million. $61.8 million was distributed in compensation the families of the 248 Iranians killed.
Clearly, this is a very tragic event that shocked the world. It
strained the already tense Iranian-US relations. The US never apologized to Iran, or admitted any wrong doing. Even the case study published by the Navy states the crew acted in a proper manner when dealing with what they thought was a threat, and the Capitan made a correct decision to protect his ship. If better technology was available, the Vincennes might have been better able to identify the aircraft as civilian. But clearly, the tragic event hurt the families and friends of the 290 civilians who died on that day.


Works Cited
Associated Press. "JET: US ship commander believed plane was a fighter." Daily Herld 04 July. 1988.
Associated Press. "US downplays similarities to KAL 007" Daily Herld 04 July. 1988.
Erlanger, Steven. "Similarities with KAL Flight are rejected by US admiral." New York Times [New York, NY] 04 July. 1988.
Fogarty. Formal Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iran Air flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Washington: 18 August 1988.
Halloron, Ricahard. " THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT 655: U.S. DOWNS IRAN AIRLINER MISTAKEN FOR F-14; 290 REPORTED DEAD; A TRAGEDY, REAGAN SAYS; ACTION IS DEFENDED." New York Times [New York, NY] 04 July. 1988.
Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War The Iran-Iraq military conflict. US: Routledge, 1991.
The Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America. Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic republic of Iran V. United States of America). International Court of Justice, Hague. 24 July 1990. "Mistaken Identity." Air Crash Investigation. National Geographic. Canada . 2005.
Rogers, Will and Sharon Rogers. Strom Center : The ISS Vincennes and Iran Air Flight 655: A personal account of Tragedy and Terrorism. Annapolis : Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Thomson Gale. Iran. Ed. Mikko Canini. United States: Grenh ven Press, 2005

[SmAlbany]

The following site was recently brought to my attention

http://airflightdisaster.com

The site managers had asked me if they could use a picture of mine so I checked it out.

It's a pretty good compilation of aviation incidents - even minor ones that might not get into the mainstream news.