March 27, 2014

WE GAAN: The Horror and Absurdity of History’s Worst Plane Crash

Computer rendering of the KLM and Pan Am 747s colliding at Tenerife.

Most people have never heard of Tenerife, a pan-shaped speck in the Atlantic. It’s one of the Canary Islands, a volcanic chain governed by the Spanish, clustered a few hundred miles off the coast of Morocco. The big town on Tenerife is Santa Cruz, and its airport, beneath a set of cascading hillsides, is called Los Rodeos. There, on March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747s — one belonging to KLM, the other to Pan Am — collided on a foggy runway. Five hundred and eighty-three people were killed in what remains the biggest air disaster in history.

The magnitude of the accident speaks for itself, but what makes it particularly unforgettable is the startling set of ironies and coincidences that preceded it. Indeed most airplane crashes result not from a single error or failure, but from a chain of improbable errors and failures, together with a stroke or two of really bad luck. Never was this illustrated more calamitously, and almost to the point of absurdity, than on that Sunday afternoon over 30 years ago.

In 1977, in only its eighth year of service, the Boeing 747 is already the biggest, most influential, and possibly the most glamorous commercial jetliner ever built. For just these reasons, it’s hard not to imagine what a story it would be — and how much carnage might result — should two of these behemoths ever hit each other. Really, though, what are the chances of that — a Hollywood script if ever there was one.

Imagine we’re there:

Both of the Tenerife 747s are charters. Pan Am has come from Los Angeles, with a stopover in New York; KLM from its home base in Amsterdam. As it happens, neither is supposed to be on Tenerife in the first place. They are scheduled to land at Las Palmas, on the nearby island of Grand Canary, where many of the passengers are on their way to meet cruise ships. After a bomb planted by Canary Island separatists explodes in the Las Palmas airport flower shop, they divert temporarily to Los Rodeos, along with several other flights, arriving around 2 p.m.

The Pan Am aircraft, registered N736PA, is no stranger to notoriety. In January, 1970, this very same plane completed the inaugural commercial voyage of a 747, between New York’s Kennedy airport and London-Heathrow. Somewhere on its nose is the dent from a champagne bottle. White with a blue window stripe, it wears the name Clipper Victor in frilly writing along the forward fuselage. The KLM 747, also blue and white, is named The Rhine.

Both aircraft photographed while waiting on the Tenerife holding pad prior to the accident.

Both aircraft photographed while waiting on the Tenerife holding pad prior to the accident.

Let’s not forget the airlines themselves: Pan Am, arguably the most storied franchise in the history of aviation, requires little introduction. KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines), for its part, is the oldest continuously operating airline in the world, founded in 1919 and highly regarded for its safety and punctuality.The KLM captain, Jacob Van Zanten, whose errant takeoff roll will soon kill nearly 600 people, including himself and all 247 others on his plane, is the airline’s top 747 instructor pilot and a KLM celebrity. Passengers may recognize him in the concourse, or descending the spiral staircase of the 747’s first class cabin. His confident visage stares out from KLM’s magazine ads. Later, when KLM executives first get word of the crash, they will attempt to contact Van Zanten in hopes of sending him to Tenerife to aid the investigation team.

The normally lazy Los Rodeos is packed with diversions. The Rhine and Clipper Victor sit adjacent to each other at the southeast corner of the apron, their wingtips almost touching. Finally at around 4 o’clock, Las Palmas begins accepting traffic again. (Imagine, today, the idea of an airport reopening within a few hours of a terrorist bombing.) Pan Am is quickly ready for departure, but the lack of room and the angle at which the jets face each other requires that KLM leave first.

The weather is fine until just before the accident, and if not for KLM requesting extra fuel at the last minute, both would be on their way sooner. During the delay, a heavy blanket of fog swoops down from the hills and envelopes the airport. That fuel also meant extra weight, affecting how quickly the 747 would, or would not, become airborne. For reasons you’ll see in a moment, that would be critical.

Because of the tarmac congestion, the normal route to runway 30 is blocked. Departing planes will need to taxi down on the runway itself. Reaching the end, they’ll make a 180-degree turn before taking off in the opposite direction. This procedure, rare at commercial airports, is called a “back-taxi.” At Tenerife in ’77, it will put two 747s on the same runway at the same time, invisible not only to each other, but to the control tower as well. The airport has no ground tracking radar.

KLM taxis ahead and onto the runway, with the Pan Am Clipper ambling several hundred yards behind. Captain Van Zanten will steer to the end, turn around, then hold in position until authorized for takeoff. Pan Am’s instructions are to turn clear along a left-side taxiway in order to allow the other plane’s departure. Once off the runway, they will report so to the tower.

Unable to differentiate the taxiways in the low visibility, the Pan Am pilots miss their assigned turnoff. Continuing to the next one is no big problem, but now they’re on the runway for several additional seconds.

Depiction of the Los Rodeos airport layout and the chain of events leading to the disaster.

Depiction of the Los Rodeos airport layout and the chain of events leading to the disaster.

Having wheeled into position at the end, Van Zanten comes to a stop. His first officer, Klaas Meurs, takes the radio and receives the ATC route clearance. This is not a takeoff clearance, but rather a procedure outlining turns, altitudes, and frequencies for use once airborne. Normally it is received well prior to an aircraft taking the runway, but the pilots have been too busy with checklists and taxi instructions until now. They are tired, annoyed, and anxious to get going. The irritability in the pilots’ voices, Van Zanten’s in particular, has been duly noted by the control tower and other pilots.

There are still a couple of dominos yet to fall, but now the final act is in motion — literally. Because the route clearance comes where and when it does, it is mistaken it for a takeoff clearance as well. First officer Meurs, sitting to Van Zanten’s right, acknowledges the altitudes, headings and fixes, then finishes off with an unusual, somewhat hesitant phrase, backdropped by the sound of accelerating engines. “We are now, uh, at takeoff.”

Van Zanten releases the brakes. “We gaan,” he is heard saying on the cockpit voice recorder. “Let’s go.” And with that, his mammoth machine begins barreling down the fog-shrouded runway, completely without permission.

“At takeoff” is not standard phraseology among pilots. But it’s explicit enough to grab the attention of the Pan Am crew and the control tower. It’s hard for either party to believe KLM is actually moving, but both reach for their microphones to make sure.

“And we’re still taxiing down the runway,” relays Bob Bragg, the Pan Am first officer.

At the same instant, the tower radios a message to KLM. “Okay,” says the controller. “Standby for takeoff. I will call you.”

There is no reply, but the silence is taken as a tacit, if not exactly proper, acknowledgment.

Either of these transmissions would be, should be, enough to stop Van Zanten cold in his tracks. He still has time to discontinue the roll. The problem is, because they occur simultaneously, they overlap.

Pilots and controllers communicate via two-way VHF radios. The process is similar to speaking over a walkie-talkie: a person activates a microphone, speaks, then releases the button and waits for an acknowledgment. It differs from using a telephone, for example, as only one party can speak at a time, and has no idea what his message actually sounds like over the air. If two or more microphones are clicked at the same instant, the transmissions cancel each other out, delivering a noisy occlusion of static or a high-pitched squeal called a “heterodyne.” Rarely are heterodynes dangerous. But at Tenerife this is the last straw.

Van Zanten hears only the word “Okay,” followed by a five-second squeal. He keeps going.

Ten seconds later there is one final exchange, clearly and maddeningly audible on the post-crash tapes. “Report when runway clear,” the tower says to Pan Am.

“We’ll report when we’re clear,” acknowledges Bob Bragg.

Focused on the takeoff, Van Zanten and his first officer apparently miss this. But the second officer, sitting behind them, does not. Alarmed, with their plane now racing forward at a hundred knots, he leans forward. “Is he not clear?” he asks. “That Pan American?”

“Oh, yes,” Van Zanten answers emphatically.

In the Pan Am cockpit, nose-to-nose with the still unseen, rapidly approaching interloper, there’s a growing sense that something isn’t right. “Let’s get the fuck out of here,” Captain Victor Grubbs says nervously.

A few moments later, the lights of the KLM 747 emerge out of the grayness, dead ahead, 2,000 feet away and closing fast.

“There he is!” cries Grubbs, shoving the thrust levers to full power. “Look at him! Goddam, that son of a bitch is coming!” He yanks the plane’s steering tiller, turning left as hard as he can, toward the grass at the edge of the runway.

“Get off! Get off! Get off!” shouts Bob Bragg.

Van Zanten sees them, but it’s too late. Attempting to leapfrog, he pulls back on the elevators, dragging his tail along the pavement for 70 feet in a hail of sparks. He almost makes it, but just as his plane breaks ground, its undercarriage and engines slice into the ceiling of the Clipper Victor, instantly demolishing its midsection and setting off a series of explosions.

Badly damaged, the Rhine settles back to the runway, skids hard on its belly for another thousand feet, and is consumed by fire before a single one of its 248 occupants can escape.

Remarkably, of 396 passengers and crew aboard the Pan Am jumbo, 61 of them survived, including all five people in the cockpit — the three-man crew, and two off-duty employees riding in the jumpseats.

Over the past few years, I’ve been fortunate enough to meet two of those survivors, and to hear their stories first-hand. I say that nonchalantly, but this is probably the closest I’ve ever come to meeting, for lack of a better term, a hero. Romanticizing the fiery deaths of 583 people is akin to the romanticizing of war, but there’s a certain mystique to the Tenerife disaster, a gravity so strong that shaking these survivors’ hands produced a feeling akin to that of a little kid meeting his favorite baseball player. These men were there, emerging from the wreckage of what, for some of us, was an event of mythic proportions.

I was introduced to Jack Ridout in New York City in the summer of 2004, where I’d been invited for the taping of a National Geographic special. At Tenerife, Ridout had been sitting in coach with his girlfriend, who also made it out. After the impact, he helped save several others, pushing them through an emergency exit before jumping to safety. After his release from the hospital, a photograph of Ridout — bandaged, but without critical injuries — appeared in several newspapers.

The second survivor I met was Bob Bragg, the Pan Am first officer. I met him in Los Angeles, on the set of a documentary being made for the Discovery Channel about the 30th anniversary of the accident.

It was Bragg who had uttered, “And we’re still taxiing down the runway” – seven easy words should have saved the day, but instead were lost forever in the shriek and crackle of a blocked transmission. Just thinking about it gives me the chills.

But there’s nothing dark about Bob Bragg — nothing that, on the surface, feels moored to the nightmare of ’77. He’s one of the most easygoing people you’ll ever meet. Gray-haired, bespectacled and articulate, he looks and sounds like what he is: a retired airline pilot.

God knows how many times he’s recounted the collision to others. He speaks about the accident with a practiced ease, in a voice of modest detachment, as if he’d been a spectator watching from afar. Of course, the story needs no hyperbole to be terrifying. If anything, Bragg’s ungarnished narrative makes it even more so. As do the strange and astounding details that normally don’t make it into the interviews and TV shows. You can read all the transcripts, pore over the findings, watch the documentaries a hundred times over. Not until you sit with Bob Bragg and hear the unedited account do you get a full sense of what happened. The basic story is well known; it’s the ancillaries that make it moving — and surreal:

Bragg describes the initial impact as little more than “a bump and some shaking.” All five men in the cockpit, located at the forward end of the 747’s distinctive upper-deck hump, saw the KLM jet coming, and had ducked. Knowing they’d been hit, Bragg instinctively reached upward in an effort to pull the “fire handles” — a set of four, overhead-mounted levers that cut off the supply of fuel, air, electricity and hydraulics running to and from the engines. His arm groped helplessly. When he looked up, the ceiling was gone.

Turning around, he realized that the entire upper deck had been sheared off at a point just aft of his chair. He could see all the way aft to the tail, 200 feet behind him. The fuselage was shattered and burning. He and captain Grubbs were alone in their seats, on a small, fully exposed perch 35 feet above the ground. Everything around them had been lifted away like a hat. The second officer and jumpseat stations, their occupants still strapped in, were hanging upside-down through what used to be the ceiling of the first class cabin.

There was no option other than to jump. Bragg stood up, put one hand on the back of the captain’s seat-back, and hurled himself over the side. He landed in the grass below, feet-first, and miraculously suffered little more than an injured ankle. Grubbs followed, and he too was mostly unharmed. The others from the cockpit would unfasten their belts and shimmy down the sidewalls to the main cabin floor before similarly leaping to safety.

Once on the ground, they faced a deafening roar. The plane had been pancaked into the grass, but because the cockpit control lines were severed, the engines were still running at full power. It took several moments before the motors began coming apart. Bragg remembers one of the engines’ huge forward turbofans detaching from its shaft, falling forward onto the ground with a thud.

The fuselage was engulfed by fire. A number of passengers, most of them seated in forward portions of the cabin, had made it onto the craft’s left wing, and were standing at the leading edge, about 20 feet off the ground. Bragg ran over, encouraging them to jump. A few minutes later, the plane’s center fuel tank exploded, propelling a plume of flames and smoke a thousand feet into the sky.

The airport’s ill-equipped rescue team, meanwhile, was over at the KLM site, the first wreckage they’d come to after learning there’d been a crash. They hadn’t yet realized that two planes were involved, one of them with survivors. Eventually, authorities opened the airport perimeter gates, urging anybody with a vehicle drive toward the crash scene to help. Bob Bragg tells the cracked story of standing there in fog, surrounded by stunned and bleeding survivors, watching his plane burn, when suddenly a taxicab pulls up out of nowhere.

Bragg returned to work a few months later. He eventually transferred to United when that carrier took over Pan Am’s Pacific routes in the late 1980s, and retired from the company as a 747 captain. Today he lives in Virginia with his wife, Dorothy.

During the Discovery Channel shoot, I traveled with Bob Bragg and the producers to the aircraft storage yards at Mojave, California, where he was interviewed alongside a mothballed 747. You can see him in the photo below, describing that incredible leap from the upper-deck.


Discovery Channel filming, 2006, at Mojave. Photo by author


The day before, using a flight deck mock-up, director Phil Desjardins filmed a reenactment of the Tenerife collision, with a trio actors sitting in as the KLM crew. The actors, who in the end did an excellent job, had studied the script well, but it was apparent during rehearsal that none had much understanding of airline flying, or how to operate a jetliner’s controls. (Like many people intimate with airline flying, I’m quick to criticize the heavy-handed portrayals cooked up by Hollywood, but by the time Desjardins called “cut” for the seventh time, for a scene only 15 seconds long, I had a new appreciation for his art.)


photo by author


At one point, to provide the actors with a helpful demo, it was suggested that Bob Bragg and I get inside the mock-up and run through a practice takeoff. A good idea. Bragg took the captain’s seat, and I took the first officer’s seat. We read through a makeshift checklist and went through the motions of a simulated takeoff. That’s when I looked across, and all of a sudden it hit me:

Here’s Bob Bragg, lone surviving pilot of Tenerife, sitting in a cockpit, pretending to be Jacob Van Zanten, whose error made the whole thing happen.

Surely Bragg wanted no part of this twisted karma, and I hadn’t the courage to make note of it out loud — assuming it hadn’t already dawned on him. But I could barely keep the astonishment to myself. One more creepy irony in a story so full of them.

This article was originally published on and is used here with the author’s permission. Patrick Smith is an airline pilot, author, and host of His new book is COCKPIT CONFIDENTIAL: Everything You Need to Know About Air TravelHe lives in Somerville, Massachusetts.

About the Author

Patrick Smith



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  • pk47

    Very interesting re-telling of perhaps one of the most oft-repeated examples of what not to do. I may add that back-tracking (what you call back-taxi), is not rare at all, at several airports around the world, especially those airports with a single runway, however, this by itself is not a major contributing factor for that unique accident. The decision by the KLM Captain to begin the take-off roll, without an explicit take-off clearance from the tower, is what really set those tragic events in motion. The diversion from Las Palmas, the delay, the extra fuel, the fog, the single runway, the missing of the exit (in fog), the crew rest times, and every other factor mentioned, are happening on a daily basis around the world’s airports, yet thankfully, we did not witness a similar accident. If Captain Jacob Louis Veldhuyzen van Zanten waited a few more seconds for his clearance, then we could be back to Mar 27, 1977 where Most people have never heard of Tenerife.

    • Arjen All

      Nonsense, read CVR PanAm, PanAm pilot did not like it at all.

      Back-tracking is normal, except when there is a C-4, C-5, runway possibility. A lot easier to perform with 747.

      People who do take safety in account would never act like people in tower did.

      Lot of reports do say it was impossible for PanAm to do a 140, very weird, KLM did a 180.

      Crew rest times was only a US issue, USA does not have safety laws that do protect employees ….

      Employees KLM were protected by law, chocking news in USA. Everything was already arranged with KLM HQ.

      Just US propaganda, US propaganda, US propaganda. USA the country with lie first policy.

      Check FAA site today, they still ignore communication PanAm crew, even PanAm crew thought KLM got takeoff clearance …. At least were very worried.

      First response co-pilot PanAm, no …. uh. What no … uh?

      No is a negative, he just heard OK from tower …..

  • marc frank

    Being a survivor of the lynyrd skynyrd plane crash, I had to watch it. I met one female survivor of the canary islands disaster.

  • marc frank

    There is nothing more graphic and brutal.

  • Your “Continued on the Next Page >>” link tries to take me to The year and the month look a bit off on that URL, so I get a 404 error. The pages [1] [2] option looks (and works!) fine.

  • David Alexander

    I am a survivor of this accident. While 544 people died immediately, I am of 75 initial survivors and am in a subgroup of 14 walking survivors who were treated at Candelario Hospital then transported to Hotel Mencey. I am also 1 of 2 photographers that Sunday afternoon. Recently I published a book about my experience and more. My book is “Never Wait for the Fire Truck” and is on Amazon. Even more recently I commissioned a website for the book: which also has some of my photos from that day and more.

  • Dan M

    This seems like the dark ages of technology… I hope airlines today have clearer radio capabilities and some sort of radar on every jet that shows what is in front of it for gods sake!

  • Arjen All

    US still ignores till present day what was said in PanAm Cockpit, ignore, ignore, ignore.

    PanAm pilots did panic,

    CVR PanAm
    “Let’s get the (* U APP Thank you ((1706:32.7))
    ##) right here

    get the « # out

    of here ((chuckle))
    CAM-2 Yeh, he’s anxious isn’t he
    1706:36.2 •
    CAM-3 Yeh after he held*’us up for
    an hour and a half, that
    CAM-2 Yeh, that #
    CAM-3 Now he’s in a rush
    CAM-1 There he is look
    at him ###
    that that ###
    ###’•*-‘* is comi

    CVR PanAm
    Cam-1:”let’s get the fuck out of here ……. Why?
    Cam-2: Yeh, he’s anxious isn’t he……. Why?
    CAM-3 Yeh after he held*’us up for an hour and a half, that ## …. Why?
    CAM-2 Yeh, that # …. Why?
    CAM-3 Now he’s in a rush … Why?


    And everyone thinks KLM just got an ATC clearance? Very …. late ….. Rush?

    Many “CVRs” do not give this text, they go from PanAm … to KLM. … This one gives both CVR’s.

    This is out of official report of the airline pilots association, even till today it ignored by them.

    FAA still ignores it
    Read section: In the final minute before the collision, key misunderstandings occur among all the parties involved. And in the end, the KLM pilot initiates takeoff even though Air Traffic Control has not issued the proper clearance.

    It is not between [], it is added afterwards. KLM pilot did a 1.1 thurst check, icing check ….

  • tony petres

    They say a plane wreck is always a combo of events and human interactions. However, the KLM cap. seems to have been the living model of a dangerous “type A” personality. These days, it would have been possible for the KLM first officer to have demanded out loud that the take of roll be cancelled. In 1977, such action might well have cost him his job. If a take-off abort could have happened early enough, a huge disaster might have been either avoided or defused to some unknown extent. As it was, it was the worst case scenario for nearly everyone.

  • Rest in peace ( 2017 ) Capt. Robert Bragg.